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Citizens and
PEOPLES
The thoughtful Left has put increasing stress on the rights 
of people as citizens rather than workers. Yet citizenship is 
difficult to reconcile with the claims of a multicultural 
society. Barry Hindess argues that our ideas on 
citizenship need a rethink.
he public discourse of liberal 
democracy combines elements that 
stress homogeneity with others that 
stress diversity. The idea of a 
dominant national culture, to which immigrants 
should be assimilated, coexists with a celebration 
of cultural diversity. In the United States, for 
example, a dominant image is that of the 'melting 
pot'—suggesting that diverse cultural elements 
will be melted down into a common American 
substance. But there is also the potent image of 
the Statue of Liberty—described in the verse at­
tached to its base as "Mother of Exiles", that is, 
offering a home for those whose roots are in 
numerous other communities.
In many respects the relationship between ideas of citizen­
ship and of multiculturalism could be seen as falling into
this pattern, with the latter representing an acknow­
ledgment of cultural diversity that goes somewhat beyond 
the stricter understandings of the former. However, multi­
culturalism has also been understood in a stronger sense. 
Canada is often taken as providing a model for the 
development of multiculturalism, and one of the most 
revealing definitions appears in the glossary to the 1987 
report of the Standing Committee on Multiculturalism of 
the Canadian Parliament. Multiculturalism is described as: 
"Recognition of the diverse culture of a plural society 
based on three principles: we all have an ethnic origin 
(equality); all our cultures deserve respect (dignity); and 
cultural pluralism needs official support." The three prin­
ciples taken together strongly suggest that the cultures 
deserving of respect and of public support can be identified 
in terms of their ethnic origin. This is certainly how multi­
culturalism has normally been understood. But it is far 
from clear why cultural diversity should be identified with 
ethnic diversity in this way.
A second issue raised by this definition is that of public 
support for minority cultures. Within limits, recognition of
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the presence of diverse cul­
tures poses no great prob­
lem for the relaxed 
understandings of citizen­
ship characteristic of 
liberal-democratic dis­
course. The active promo­
tion of cultural pluralism 
by public authorities is, or 
is often thought to be, 
another matter entirely. It 
is a comparatively recent 
development, dating in 
most western societies 
from the 1960s or later. It is 
also highly contentious— 
in part because public sup­
port for minority cultures 
has sometimes been 
thought to conflict with 
the view that citizens 
should be treated as 
equals.
To see why there is a prob­
lem here, and why it is a 
political problem now, it is 
necessary to consider the 
relationship between mul- 
ticulturalism and contem­
porary western views of 
citizenship. Multicul- 
turalism is indeed difficult 
to reconcile with many of 
the ways in which citizen­
ship is commonly under­
stood. I will argue that our 
understanding of citizen­
ship should be modified to 
take account of the ines­
capable cultural pluralism 
of most societies in the 
world today. I will con­
clude by offering a 
qualified defence of multi- 
culturalism in terms of a 
pluralist account of 
citizenship.
^  the tradition of western 
Political thought citizens
ave normally beenregarded as inde- "It is far from clear why cultural diversity should be identified with ethnic diversity.”
Pendent—meaning that
^ y  are not dependent on others for their legal standing as 
^embers of the community. They are not, for example,
inHonhirorl con/anfc nr minnrc
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^ tte ls , indentured servants or inors.
flo w in g  the Enlightenment, the rights and obligations 
associated with citizenship have required certain qualities 
the citizen. Those qualities have frequently been under- 
r °°d in universalistic terms: that is, they have been 
Warded as qualities that are possessed or may be acquired.
by any normal human individual. However, since com­
munities of citizens invariably inhabit a world of numerous 
autonomous political units, to be a citizen is always to be a 
member of one community among others. The community 
to which a citizen belongs will be a community of citizens 
(and others), but it will also be identified as a community 
in other ways. In classical Athenian democracy, for ex­
ample, Athenian citizens had to be sons of Athenian citizens 
(and of Athenian mothers from the middle of the 5th cen-
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tury BC)—although this requirement was relaxed in the 
dosing stages of the Pelepponesian War.
Notions of descent (and the apparently more respectable 
surrogate notion of a distinctive national culture mat can-, 
not readily be acquired by persons who are not bom into 
it) have always played an important part in the way citizen­
ship has been understood within particular communities. 
In the modern period, such notions have generally 
coexisted in uneasy relationship with other principles of 
inclusion and exclusion. Germany, Israel and Japan are 
examples of 'western' democracies in which citizenship is 
restricted primarily in terms of descent. Elsewhere the legal 
requirements of citizenship are usually less restrictive, al­
though the implicit or explicit identification of the national 
community in terms of descent remains a common feature 
of public discussion of the issue.
However, what most distinguishes the conceptions of 
citizenship of the modem west from those of classical 
antiquity and the early modern period is the radical 
egalitarianism of the modem sort. Citizenship in ancient 
Athens and Rome was a matter of a limited set of statuses 
within a larger and highly differentiated network of 
statuses. First, citizens were divided into legally defined 
classes with distinct rights and obligations. Secondly, most 
adult members of the community could not be citizens, if 
only because women and slaves were not legally regarded 
as independent persons. Thirdly, even if we leave to one 
side inhabitants of subject territories, there were numerous 
independent persons subject to the laws of the community 
but not possessing the political rights of citizens. Metics in 
Athens, for example, were personally free non-citizens who 
were nevertheless subject to taxation and liable for military 
service.
With some qualifications, the most influential of contem­
porary western understandings of citizenship have been 
egalitarian in all three of these respects. First, citizens are 
not divided into legally defined classes or estates. Indeed, 
since the Enlightenment it has been difficult to mount an 
intellectually respectable case for any such division be­
tween citizens—although sterling efforts were once made 
to defend property qualifications for the franchise. Second­
ly, almost all members of the community are regarded as 
legally independent persons, and therefore as citizens— 
children now being the only significant exceptions. The 
third issue is more problematic. Although there are sig­
nificant alien minorities in all societies, the predominant 
western view seems to be that all permanent residents 
should normally have the status of citizen. Even those who 
would restrict citizenship on grounds of descent tend to be 
egalitarian in this respect. The assumption is that non­
citizens may be present in the community but only on a 
temporary basis. They would normally be expected to 
move on, or else, if they were eligible, to become citizens. '
This egalitarian understanding of citizenship, together 
with the view that all citizens should share to some degree 
in a common culture, suggest that citizenship is now con­
sidered in the West against the background of a conception 
of community in which a unified polity is expected to go 
hand-in-hand with a unified national culture. Exceptions
such as Belgium, Canada and the United Kingdom are 
regarded as anomalous. They are also, for precisely the 
same reason, regarded as potentially unstable.
I stress this aspect of contemporary western understanding 
of citizenship partly in order to make explicit what is often 
taken for granted. But my more serious concern is to bring 
out how peculiar is this assumption of cultural 
homogeneity. In fact, the experience of cultural diversity 
has been the normal human condition throughout recorded 
history. Wherever there have been states (and this includes 
all societies in which there have been citizens) they have 
coexisted with other states or with non-state societies 
beyond their borders. Political boundaries have always 
been disputed and subject to change, and those boundaries 
have always been permeable to a greater or lesser degree. 
States have always had to live with culturally diverse 
populations, including significant groups of foreign de­
scent.
The perception of cultural difference is often, of course, a 
matter of perspective. Much of the diversity that Americans 
or Australians regard as an important feature of their own 
societies might also be subsumed within a broader notion 
of a common culture. However that may be, the modem 
experience of cultural diversity poses a problem for all 
western (and non-westem) societies. First, the discourse of 
citizenship normally presupposes a common culture which 
functions both to sustain citizens' lives together and to 
distinguish them from citizens of other communities. 
Secondly, however that common culture might be iden­
tified, the community will invariably contain a significant 
minority who do not share it. The idea that the political 
community consists, or should normally consist, of those 
who share a common culture is an illusion. To the extent 
that that illusion seriously informs political discussion it 
can also be a dangerous one.
It is important to be clear about the nature of the difficulty 
here. First, the disjunction between the presumed cultural 
unity of its citizens and the multicultural reality of a society 
is a problem largely in consequence of the peculiarly 
egalitarian character of the contemporary western view of 
citizenship—with its sources in Enlightenment ideas of 
natural human equality on the one hand, and the variously 
idealised Enlightenment and Romantic accounts of the 
political communities of Athens and Rome on the other.
Secondly, the cultural and ethnic pluralism of national 
populations in the west is a consequence of the incorpora­
tion of distinct societies in a relatively open regime of trade 
and communication. The pluralism of populations in con­
temporary societies cannot be explained simply as a legacy 
of the mingling of populations resulting from wars and 
empires. It should not be expected to disappear even if the 
age of empires and of wars were to recede into the past. 
And this pluralism of populations has shown no signs of 
withering away during the long postwar peace (even in 
those societies that do not regard themselves as nations of 
immigrants). It is this which has been largely responsible 
for the gradual development of multiculturalism in 
western Europe, both as a set of governmental practices 
and as a pressing political issue. Cultural pluralism cannot
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be eradicated through education, stricter control of borders 
0r removal of unwanted persons. For the foreseeable fu­
ture, then, all western communities will continue to be 
composed of both citizens and persons of several other 
statuses. While the greater part of the population in most 
Western societies will continue to be citizens (in contrast, 
say, to the situation in the Gulf Emirates), there will be 
significant minorities who are not—and many of the latter 
vvill be present illegally. In any liberal society even mem­
bers of this last group will have rights. Some of them will 
also fall ill, or suffer from accidents or unemployment, and 
some will have children—all of which generate demands 
on the public services provided by the host community.
Now consider the question of multiculturalism. I began by 
noting that what is contentious is not the recognition of 
cultural diversity, but rather the question of whether and 
in what respects it is legitimate to provide public support 
for minority cultures. Why should this be an issue? One 
reason involves a hostility to the minority groups thought 
likely to benefit from multiculturalism—or rather, a hos­
tility to their effective presence within the host community. 
What is at stake according to this rejection of multicul­
turalism is the defence of the community of citizens against 
what are regarded as alien intrusions. Such claims rest on 
a conception of community, and of citizenship as the nor­
mal form of membership of that community, that has a 
powerful support in all western societies.
A very different kind of reason why support for minority 
cultures might be opposed is that it appears to involve the. 
unequal treatment of citizens. It is one thing, the argument 
might go, to provide members of minority groups with, 
say, language classes, wheelchair access to public places, 
and other kinds of assistance in order that they may par­
ticipate on something like equal terms in the majority 
community. It is another thing entirely to provide members 
of particular minorities with additional support to pursue 
their culturally distinctive version of the good life.
to fact, multiculturalism would seem to conflict first with 
the contemporary, egalitarian understanding of citizen­
ship according to which there should be no legally 
Privileged estates, and secondly with the liberal view that 
individuals equally should be free, within limits, to 
Pursue their various understandings of the good life. The 
objection in both cases turns on the understanding of 
minority. If it is understood in an exclusive sense, such that 
Public support of the relevant kind would be provided to 
^embers of particular minorities only and not to others, 
'hen multiculturalism does indeed conflict with an 
e8alitarian view of the proper relation between govern­
ment and citizen.
Jhere is, however, another possibility. That is to treat the 
*j®ld of eligible minorities as potentially open-ended so 
‘'at any citizen could be a member of one or more of them, 
jjytoct, the idea that citizenship should be understood in 
tos way is implicit in the associational pluralism advo- 
j^ted by Figgis, Cole and Laski—and more recently by 
aul Hirst and John Mathews, in this journal and else­
where. This form of pluralism shares the liberal view that, 
as far as reasonably possible, individuals should be free to 
pursue their various understandings of the good life. How­
ever, it disputes the atomistic conception of relations be­
tween citizen and state that liberals derive from the view.
Briefly, the argument is that most individual purposes can 
be pursued effectively only in association with other in­
dividuals—and that within any reasonably large com­
munity there will be a plurality of purposes that 
individuals might reasonably wish to pursue. A desirable 
polity, on this view, would be one that actively promoted 
the development of associations—precisely so that in­
dividuals would be free to pursue their version of the good 
life. The state would, of course, regulate the behaviour of 
associations, but it would also recognise their autonomy 
and right to develop in accordance with their own internal 
decision-making procedures.
‘Cultural diversity has been 
the normal human 
condition throughout 
recorded history. '
Associational pluralism is not without its problems, but it 
does seem to offer an egalitarian account of citizenship that 
would not rule out the provision of public support for 
minority cultures. It is not, however, entirely consistent 
with multiculturalism as it is understood, for example, in 
the Canadian report quoted at the beginning of this paper. 
The cultures treated in multiculturalist discourse as 
deserving of respect and public support are restricted to 
those that can be identified in terms of their ethnic origin. 
In that respect, multiculturalism is essentially backward- 
looking: it aims to preserve a heritage of cultural differen­
ces that have been given by a certain kind of history.
It is this aspect of multiculturalism that appears most 
problematic from the standpoint of associational 
pluralism. The primary concern of the latter is to enhance 
the capacities of individuals—and therefore of the associa­
tions to which they might choose to belong—to pursue 
their common purposes. It is not to preserve cultural relics 
from the past. In these terms, while it might be legitimate 
in some cases to provide public support for cultures iden­
tified primarily in terms of ethnic origin, there can be no 
justification for restricting the range of eligible cultures in 
that way. Associations of Buddhists or gays should be 
regarded, at least in principle, as no less deserving of 
support than associations of Italians or Vietnamese. If there 
is a case to be made for multiculturalism in the societies of 
the modem west, it is a case that would submerge it within 
a broader program of support for cultural diversity.
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